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Basic Income Guarantee: The Gender Impact
within Households
Sara Cantillon
Glasgow Caledonian University
Caitlin McLean
University of California-Berkeley
The potential of a Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) to contribute
to gender equality is a contested issue amongst feminist scholars. This article focuses on the nature of BIG as an individually-based payment to explore its potential for reducing gender
equality, specifically intra-household inequalities in material or
financial welfare; economic autonomy; psychological well-being;
and time allocation, especially leisure time and time spent in
household and care work. We employ a gender analysis of existing BIG pilots/schemes as well as close substitutes (e.g., universal
child benefits) to assess some of the key claims about the effects
of a basic income (BI) on gendered inequality. We also present
findings from empirical work on intra-household allocation and
decision-making which underscore the role of independent income.
The article finds some support for BIG as a feminist proposal
with respect to mitigating intra-household inequality, but concludes that further empirical research is needed to argue persuasively for BIG as an instrument for furthering gender equality.
Key words: Basic Income Guarantee, gender, feminism, independent income, intra-household inequality

Basic income guarantee (BIG) proposals have gained
renewed cross-national interest in both academic and policy
circles in recent years (Caputo, 2012; Standing, 2014). In the UK,
a basic income has been supported by the Green party and the
non-partisan Citizen's Income Trust, while in other countries,
such as Finland and France, proposals for basic income pilots
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and experiments are on the agenda. A BIG can be defined as
"an income paid by a political community to all its members on
an individual basis, without means test or work requirement"
(Van Parijs, 2004, p. 8). Although the specifics of any particular
basic income proposal vary, the core characteristics of a BIG
are:
• Universality—it is paid to everyone in the population
• Individuality—it is paid to each adult rather than as
a single household payment
• Unconditionality—it is paid without conditions
regarding family or employment status
• Delivery as a cash benefit
BIG has been advocated for a variety of reasons, including
but not limited to the promotion of gender equality. However,
the question of whether to regard BIG as a feminist proposal
remains divisive. Advocates have pointed to the potential for
BIG to correct the paid work bias of contemporary social security systems and to increase women's economic autonomy
and power within the household (Fitzpatrick, 1999; McKay,
2001, 2005; Zelleke, 2011), as well as to contribute to a more
inclusive feminism via its anti-poverty and anti-exploitation
characteristics (McLean, 2015). Critics have argued that BIG
will do nothing to directly challenge the gendered division of
labor and may well reinforce it (Gheaus, 2008; Robeyns, 2001).
In her introduction to the Basic Income Studies special issue
"Should Feminists Endorse Basic Income?" Robeyns (2008)
specifically calls for a shift in an empiricist direction (analyzing the specifics of implementation and examining the available evidence) in order to help resolve some of the continuing controversy regarding basic income among feminists. This
article responds to Robeyn's call by examining the available
evidence of existing BIG pilots/schemes as well as close substitutes (e.g., universal child benefits) to assess some of the key
claims about the effects of a BIG on gendered inequality. In
addition, the article discusses the evidence base with regard to
key areas of intra-household inequalities in income and expenditures, living standards, well-being, and time use.
The broad areas of family and household dynamics with a
particular focus on gender have been the subject of intensive
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research from a wide variety of disciplines. A focus on gender
and poverty draws attention to the interactions between the
family, the labor market, and the state, and exposes the gendered nature of the separation between the public and private
spheres. Central to this has been the division between the
private and the public sphere and the use of collective units of
analysis. In conventional analyses of poverty and income inequality, the household is taken as the unit of analysis, but this
neglects what goes on within households. The household is in
effect treated as a "black box," with little or no attention paid
to differences among household members in access to and
control over resources. In taking the household as the income
recipient unit, it is assumed resources are shared so that each
individual in a given household has the same standard of
living. However, if different individuals within households
actually experience different levels of well-being, this could
have major implications for our understanding of poverty, for
the way anti-poverty policies are framed, or for the purposes
of this paper, the potential impact of a BIG scheme.
There is now a substantial theoretical and empirical literature investigating within-household inequalities, focusing on
such issues as the allocation of resources, income pooling, financial decision-making, expenditure, and material outcomes
(Bonke & Browning, 2009; Cantillon, 2013; Lee & Pocock, 2007;
Lundberg, Pollak, & Wales, 1997; Phipps & Burton, 1998;
Stocks, Díaz-Martínez, & Halleröd, 2007; Vogler & Pahl, 1994).
For the purposes of this paper, we focus on the control and
allocation of resources within the household, particularly in
terms of living standards of individual household members,
but also in terms of the decision making processes within it.

The Individual Nature of a Basic Income
and Intra-household Inequality
Many BIG advocates (e.g., Bambrick, 2006; Birnbaum,
2012; Fitzpatrick, 1999; Zelleke, 2011) have emphasized the
unconditionality of a BIG as the crucial means by which it
supports gender equality goals, arguing that its neutrality regarding paid employment or unpaid caregiving avoids the
problem of choosing between systems of social security which
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require labor market participation and therefore devalue domestic and care work, or systems which reward such work but
cement separate spheres of labor for men and women.
However, an additional key thread underpinning many
arguments is the importance of a BIG as an individual benefit,
contributing to gender equality via economic independence for
women (Elgarte, 2008; Fitzpatrick, 1999; McKay, 2005; Parker,
1993; Robeyns, 2001). The individual nature of a BIG is especially crucial given accumulating empirical evidence on intrahousehold economic inequalities, related power differentials
between men and women, and the importance of the recipient
of income coming into the household (Bennett & Sung, 2013;
Cantillon & Nolan, 2001; Goode, Callender, & Lister, 1998;
Lundberget al., 1997; Nyman & Reinikainen, 2007). Individual
benefits means that the entirety of household income does not
necessarily go directly to a single household breadwinner, nor
does the value of the benefit decrease by virtue of being in a
coupled relationship, which penalizes low-income women for
their partner's earnings, even if they do not benefit from them
equally. A BIG treats women as citizens in their own right,
rather than as dependents within a household (Pateman, 2004).
The general argument that BIG could facilitate a reduction
in intra-household inequality can be broken down into four
possible effects. First is the effect on the financial or material
welfare of women. A key line of inquiry on within-household
dynamics has been to investigate differences in living standards among members of couples (Cantillon & Nolan, 2001;
Nyman & Reinikainen, 2007). In relation to personal spending money, for example, Nyman found that in Sweden women
have insufficient access to personal spending money more
often than men, at 63 versus 51 per cent respectively (Nyman,
2002, p. 18). In the UK, Pahl (1989, p. 148) found that husbands were more likely than wives to have personal spending
money and to have more to spend on themselves. Vogler and
Pahl (1994, p. 281) found that 58 per cent of couples had equal
access to personal spending, in 12 per cent the man had more
and in 4 percent the woman had more (Vogler & Pahl, 1994).
A consistent theme of the literature on distribution of resources within the family is the role which the wife's own
income might play. In a study based on individual-level
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non-monetary indicators across a wide range of goods and activities, the average gap between the wife's and the husband's
deprivation index score was consistently narrower where the
wife had an income of her own. Further, there was a positive
correlation between the reduction in the gap between husbands' and wives' scores on the deprivation index and the
wife's income level, such that the gap decreased as the wife's
independent income increased (Cantillon, 2013; Cantillon &
Nolan, 1998).
Paying a basic income to all individuals irrespective of
work status or household income could, in theory, raise living
standards and improve access to economic resources within
the household, particularly for those who otherwise would
not have an independent source of income, or whose income
is lower, such that there would be a within-household redistributive effect that would benefit women, who are more likely
to be in such a position (Callan, Nolan, Walsh, McBride, &
Nestor, 2000; Cantillon & Nolan, 2001; Lundberg et al., 1997).
On the other hand, material welfare and an independent
income can also be linked to labor force participation. A key
critique of the argument that BIG would serve to reduce intrahousehold inequalities between men and women rests precisely on the fact that because BIG is an unconditional cash
benefit, it would lessen incentives to paid employment, especially for women, given their relatively weaker attachment
to the labor force compared to men, and thus counteract any
of the beneficial effects on gender equality highlighted previously (Gheaus, 2008; Robeyns, 2001). Mothers, in particular,
face additional hurdles regarding employment, such that cash
payments could encourage mothers, especially those with low
skills or in low paying jobs, to exit the labor market in favor
of informal care in the home. Further, there are potential disincentives for married women which may occur as a result
of taxing the first dollar of income beyond the basic income
(Bambrick, 2006; Fitzpatrick, 1999). This depends crucially on
the level of a BIG, how a BIG is funded, and its interaction with
the tax and social welfare system.
At the same time, predictions of a drop in women's labor
force participation may also be overstated. Sociological and
heterodox economic perspectives have emphasized broader
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motivations other than income regarding labor force participation, such as status, satisfaction, and other less tangible
benefits. The incentive for unemployed persons to take up
employment is most often measured using the "replacement
rate" (RR)—the ratio between net income out of work and net
income when in work, and research in this area reinforces the
idea of work or employment being more than just income.
Empirical data shows that there are many who choose to
work, despite facing replacement ratios of close to or over 100
percent (Callan et al., 2011). That is, they choose to be working,
even if they could be close to or even better off financially by
remaining unemployed.
BIG advocates (Fitzpatrick, 1999; Van Parijs, 1995) further
point out that existing systems of social security have substantial disincentives to work embodied in unemployment
and poverty traps where low-income households face severe
reductions in benefits for every dollar they earn. Combined
with logistical problems, financial costs of entering work, and
uncertainty regarding stability of employment, there is a huge
incentive to forgo work in favor of benefits, if choosing one
reduces income from the other. BIG reduces such disincentives, thus potentially making the most vulnerable women
better off, with greater rather than lesser incentive to engage
in paid labor. This issue highlights the role of women's diversity in creating ambiguous effects of BIG, with some women
likely to be gainers and some losers under any reform (see also
Robeyns, 2001).
A second possible outcome of a BIG with respect to the
reduction of gendered inequality is a related but distinct effect
concerning the role of independent income in raising economic autonomy and/or control over household resources rather
than material welfare per se. In a discussion of feminist theory
and BIG, Zelleke (2011, p. 34) discusses "the ideal of autonomy" not as "the equalisation of resources, opportunities or capabilities, but rather the guarantee of the minimal resources
necessary for individuals to pursue their own ends consistent
with their innate abilities and with a similar degree of autonomy from others over their own lives." Thus the key issue is
not simply a redistribution of income in order to reduce inequalities in material welfare, but also to reduce inequalities of
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power (Zelleke, 2011).
There is a large theoretical literature and accumulating empirical evidence to suggest that in addition to, or even regardless of, material welfare gains, independent income provides
a source of economic autonomy which, in turn, impacts bargaining and power relations with the household. Differences
between men and women in terms of their roles in household
decision-making (particularly regarding income and large expenditures) have been linked to their differences in terms of
income, status, education, and ethnicity (Cantillon & Nolan,
1998, 2001; Nyman & Reinikainen, 2007; Rake & Jayatilka,
2002). An important distinction has also been made between
high-level decisions on the allocation of resources to each area
(food, clothing, household bills, holidays, etc.) and instrumental decisions regarding the management of the budget within
each of these areas (Pahl, 1989). Several studies suggest that
the woman usually engages in the management of household
resources, while the overall allocative control and decisionmaking power rests with the man (Lauer & Yodanis, 2011).
Differences in control over household finances are therefore important in their own right, as an indicator of power,
and for the role they may play in producing and explaining
differences in living standards. Differences in management are
also important insofar as they reflect respective roles in decision-making and identify who carries the burden of responsibility for stretching scarce resources. Several UK studies,
using both small scale surveys and large nationally representative samples (Rake & Jayatilaka, 2002; Vogler, 1998; Vogler
& Pahl, 1994), have explored different systems for managing household resources and their implications for the living
standards of individual members. Rottman (1994), Cantillon,
Gannon, and Nolan (2004) and Watson, Maître, & and Whelan
(2013) used Irish data to examine this issue and also identified a number of distinct approaches to managing resources.
The studies produced similar results: while joint financial
decision-making is common among couples, in a significant
proportion of couples the husband retains control in terms of
major decisions, while the wife has the responsibility of managing resources on a week-to-week basis. Further, the responsibility for making resources stretch when money is tight falls
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disproportionately on women.
A third possible effect is that, irrespective of any material
benefit or even increased control over financial resources, a
BIG could have a positive psychological impact on women's
sense of self and well-being. Some of those studying BIG have
pointed out that this could be a result of increased recognition or valuation of unremunerated work, in the sense that activities outside the paid labor market are formally recognised
as worthwhile (Robeyns, 2001). Alternatively, it could arise
in terms of measures of psychological health and well-being
where independent income provides a greater sense of control,
as empirical studies within the intra-household literature have
demonstrated (Cantillon & Moran, 2016; Kan & Laurie 2010;
Walters, McDonough, & Strohschein, 2002).
The fourth effect relates to the issue of inequalities in
leisure time and participation in unpaid work. There is now
a vast literature documenting disparities in time use between
men and women which has specifically highlighted the greater
participation of women in unpaid domestic and care work and
the inequality of leisure time which results from this (Bianchi,
Sayer, Milkie, & Robinson, 2012; Latshaw, 2011).
BIG advocates have argued that unconditional cash benefits can raise the status of work outside the labor market, as
well as reduce economic pressure to create space for such activity. For example, McKay (2005) and Zelleke (2011) argue
that a BIG does not prioritize labor market participation at
the expense of productive activity outside the labor market
and therefore does not penalize individuals for engaging in it.
There is a tendency to assume that this would lead to continued
gender specialization; however, an unconditional, steady cash
payment could theoretically reduce pressure on men as breadwinners by providing a measure of financial security outside
labor market income, allowing space for men to reduce their
participation in the labor market and potentially to take on a
greater share of traditionally feminine tasks (Bambrick, 2006).
This could be heightened or strengthened via the psychological effect: e.g., greater societal value placed on these activities
could shape men's willingness to engage in such work.
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Expanding the Evidence Base for a Basic Income
A key limiting factor in the BIG debate is a lack of robust
evidence on potential effects and outcomes due to the fact that
there are few real world examples to study. The closest and
most famous example is the Permanent Fund Dividend in
Alaska (see Widerquist & Howard, 2012). Since 1982, each individual Alaskan has received an unconditional annual grant
funded from state oil revenue. The amount varies by year
and is very modest (usually between $1000-1500 per person)
and as such may be considered at best a partial basic income.
However, there has been little systematic analysis of the effects
of the dividend on the Alaskan population (for an overview of
available evidence, see Goldsmith, 2012).
In the absence of much real-world evidence on the effects
of a BIG, many scholars have turned to evidence provided
by a few experiments and pilot programs of a basic income
as well as related alternatives, such as the Negative Income
Tax (NIT). Although not technically a BIG as such, the most
widely analyzed evidence comes from the NIT experiments in
the U.S. and Canada. More recently there have been pilots in
developing countries which have aimed to test the effectiveness of unconditional cash transfers on alleviating poverty
and other social goals, such as those in Nambia (Haarman &
Haarman, 2012) and in India (Davala, Jhabvala, Standing, &
Kapoor Mehta, 2015).
There has also been a push to increase social scientific
analysis of the potential effects of a BIG using methods such
as laboratory experiments and attitudinal surveys, although
to date there has been little advancement in this area (but see
Haigner, Höchtl, Schneider, Wakolbinger, & Jenewein, 2012;
Marx & Peeters, 2008). Economic modelling and microsimulations of BIG reforms have been relatively more common, most
of which focus on budget and labor force participation effects
(e.g., Colombino, Locatelli, Narazani, & O'Donoghue, 2010;
Gilroy, Heimann, & Schopf, 2013), although some also contain
reference to differences among men and women within households (Callan et al., 2000).
While this paper utilizes such evidence where relevant, it
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also makes a contribution by including an underutilized source:
universal child benefits. In the UK context, Child Benefit, at
least until recently, has shared many key characteristics with
a basic income, and has been referred to as a basic income for
children (Torry, 2012; see also Levy, Matsaganis, & Sutherland,
2013). The policy is a universal, largely unconditional (the condition is that children be in full-time education) cash benefit,
paid in steady (weekly or monthly) allotments. Further, while
it is not fully individualized, it is paid to the primary caregiver,
which in the vast majority of cases is a woman, and is therefore
useful for understanding intra-household income inequalities
because it increases the amount of disposable income for the
person likely to have less labor market income. A BIG would
enhance this effect, as income would be provided for both providers and recipients of care.
Thus, policy distance is minimized, especially compared to
other commonly used proxies such as the NIT, which is meanstested, not delivered as a cash benefit and is assessed at the
household level. A key limitation of using the UK child benefit
as a proxy is the low amount of the payment (currently £20.70/
week for eldest child, £13.70 for additional children), which is
substantially below most proposals for a basic income. This
is further exacerbated by the fact that it is only paid to one
individual in the household, rather than to all. Similar child
benefits exist in many other European countries (Levy et al.,
2013) as well as in Canada (Schirle, 2015). Reference is made to
evidence from these countries where available.
Another key source of evidence is the broader literature
on intra-household inequalities, including the role of income/
economic differences, issues of control/power and patterns of
household division of labor, which provide information on the
incentive structure and processes which undergird assumptions/predictions about BIG effects with respect to gender inequality. Specifically, the article discusses the evidence base
with regard to key areas of intra-household inequalities in
income and expenditures, living standards, well-being, and
time use.
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The Impact of a Basic Income on Intra-household
Inequalities
Material Welfare
To what extent would a BIG be likely to raise women's material welfare within the household? The question of women's
independent income and, by extension, their material welfare,
will depend in part on their labor force participation. In
general, women's (especially married women's) labor market
participation tends to be more elastic than men's, although this
has decreased over time, for example, in the U.S. (Blau & Kahn,
2007). Accordingly, discussions of the impact of a BIG on employment incentives have suggested that any negative effect
is likely to be particularly pronounced for women. Evidence
from Canada suggests that there is a negative effect on labor
force participation for coupled mothers receiving child benefit,
with the largest effects for those with lower levels of education
(Schirle, 2015). However, there is a positive effect on single
mothers (Schirle & Koebel, 2015).
The most commonly cited evidence on this issue within
the BIG literature is from the NIT experiments in the U.S. and
Canada during the 1960s-1970s, which suggests that the largest
labor force participation effects were on secondary earners
such as students and married women—reducing labor market
participation on average by 19% for U.S. married women and
15% for single mothers. The effect was substantially less in the
Canadian Mincome experiment (2-3%) but was still negative
(see Widerquist, 2005).
Economic models of BIG (rather than NIT) tend to demonstrate less of a problem with labor market participation
reduction, primarily due to the elimination of poverty traps
associated with conditional or means-tested benefits, which
are currently prevalent within many systems of social security
(Colombino et al., 2010; Gilroy et al., 2013). Colombino and
colleagues (2010) model the introduction of a BIG compared to
other possible reforms (a means-tested guaranteed minimum
income, workfare, participation income) in the UK, Denmark,
Italy and Portugal. In general, they found gains to be made
in all countries from shifting toward a BIG with progressive
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taxation; however, in Italy and Portugal such a reform was associated with reductions in female labor participation rates,
which was not the case in Denmark or in the UK, where it depended on the level of the BIG. Consequently, there is reason to
be concerned about reductions in at least some women's labor
force participation following the introduction of a BIG, though
for some women work incentives are likely to be higher following such a reform.
The standard of living of the woman in the household is also
related to her position in the labor market, not least because the
level of her earnings has some effect on the household system
adopted. Using Pahl's taxonomy of household money management, Vogler found that women in full-time employment are
more likely to be part of a pooled management or independent
spheres system, whereas women with low-paid, part-time jobs
are more likely to be involved in a whole wage management or
allowance system (Vogler, 1994).These findings appear to substantiate Blood and Wolfe's (1960) resource theory of power,
which posited that the relative income of each partner was
related to his/her degree of power in the household. However,
as women's participation in the labor market has predominantly been in terms of part-time or lower paid work, this
cannot be identified as contributing to the equalization of roles
and power within the household. Instead, as Vogler argues,
women's over-representation in part-time work can be seen as
"a way of increasing household income (and meeting employers' needs for labor) without upsetting the traditional division
of labor between male breadwinners and female childbearers/
secondary earners" (1994, p. 226). Furthermore, since the extra
money earned by women in part-time positions is often incorporated into the overall household consumption fund, this can
have the effect of freeing up resources for the male's personal
consumption, thus reinforcing rather than reducing the differential living standards of men and women.
However, this type of analysis tells us little about the material welfare of those who are not in paid employment, or
whether receipt of an individualized non-market income like
a BIG would benefit such individuals, leading to decreased inequality within the home. Studies of UK child benefit suggest
that such benefits can improve women's material welfare.
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Influential research by Lundberg et al. (1997) examined the
shift from family allowance to child benefit in the 1970s, which
changed how the funds were paid, transferring money from
"the wallet to the purse," in order to assess whether there was
a corresponding increase in women and children's consumption. Specifically, they looked at expenditure on women's and
children's clothing as an individualized indicator and found
an increase in this type of consumption following the shift (see
also Goode, Callender, & Lister, 1998). This was further supported by research by Ward-Batts (2008), which controlled for
price changes in the goods under study and still found a shift
in consumption patterns from those benefiting men primarily to those benefiting women and children. However, interviews with parents claiming UK child benefit suggests that the
money goes more toward improving children's welfare than
mothers' (Farthing, 2012). This is less likely to be an issue for
a BIG, however, as it is fully individualized such that there
would be a payment for children as well as for each member
of the couple.
Further, in one of the few microsimulations of a BIG to explicitly consider gendered inequality at the individual level,
Callan et al. (2000) found evidence of a within-household redistributive effect with gains for women. Specifically, under a BIG
reform in Ireland, over 40% of women were estimated to have
a large gain in individual incomes (more than £10 per week),
compared with about 20% of men. In contrast, about half of
the men were estimated to have a loss in individual income of
more than £10 per week, while this was true for about 25% of
women. Crucially, much of the redistribution took place within
coupled relationships—spouses or partners. Household level
or combined incomes showed very little differences between
men and women. However, this was a static model and did
not take into account potential behavioral change as a result
of the introduction of a BIG. Furthermore, the simulations are
based on 1994 data, which precede both the boom and bust of
the Irish economy, the sharp rise in labor force participation
rates for women, and the more recent closing of gender gaps
in employment, unemployment, and wages in the aftermath
of both the financial crisis and subsequent austerity measures
introduced.
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Economic Autonomy
A related but distinct effect is the potential role of a basic
income in raising economic autonomy and/or control over
household resources. Autonomy and control over household
resources are partly important for contributions to material welfare, as noted previously with regard to the relationship between a woman's independent income and her living
standards.
However, autonomy is arguably valuable in its own right.
For example, recent research (Bennett & Sung, 2013) highlighted the importance of financial autonomy (including economic
independence, privacy in one's financial affairs and exercising agency with regard to personal and household spending) among low-income women in Britain. Further evidence
from qualitative interviews regarding experiences of receiving
Child Benefit in the UK is again relevant: mothers, in particular, pointed to the importance of having independent income
via Child Benefit (even though it was a low sum) and not
having to ask for money from their partners, which they found
demeaning (Farthing, 2012).
In fact, for some women, the prospect of economic autonomy is so appealing that they may be willing to trade-off reductions in their absolute level of financial resources, for example,
via less access to their partner's higher earnings. In a review
of research on within-household distributions, Bennett (2013)
devotes a section to debates about equal benefit versus autonomy, noting that there has been a shift toward individualization
of finances, at least in part due to the normative value placed
on financial independence and autonomy. A study of Swedish
couples, for example, demonstrated the importance that
women, in particular, place on reducing their financial dependence on their partners, even when this places them at a disadvantage due to their lower earnings (Nyman & Reinikainen,
2007). This type of control, which connotes a sense of entitlement to use funds as one wishes, is distinct from financial management of household resources, for which women are often
responsible and is often perceived as a burden rather than as
signifier of autonomy.
This suggests that there could be merit in providing a
BIG due to its contribution to feelings of economic autonomy,
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even if its overall contribution to material welfare is low on its
own (that is, where it is not coupled with paid employment).
However, attention must be given to the method of delivery of a BIG if there is to be control in practice rather than on
paper. This is one of the key arguments against implementing
an income floor via a Negative Income Tax rather than a BIG,
where an NIT is assessed and delivered jointly for a household
rather than on an individual basis. Care must be taken that a
BIG is understood as an individual entitlement and perhaps
administrated in such a way as to ensure independent access–
similar perhaps to the delivery of Child Benefit (UK).
Psychological Effects and Well-being
A third possible effect is that, irrespective of any material
benefit or even increased autonomy, a BIG could raise psychological valuation of unremunerated work, in the sense that activities outside the paid labor market are formally recognized
as worthwhile (Robeyns, 2001). The idea that an independent
income should be accessible, even to those outside the paid
labor market, is a well-established feminist idea. Twentieth
century feminist movements specifically called for wages for
housework as a way of recognizing, monetarily, the productive work of the household.
Pahl's (1989) classic text Money & Marriage explored financial decision-making within UK households, noting that housewives receiving a family allowance did feel a sort of symbolic
valuation for their unpaid work as a result of the monetary
payment coming into the household. Similarly, more recent
interviews with those receiving UK Child Benefit suggested
some implicit evidence of psychological valuation, where participants made reference to the hard work of caring for children
and deserving an independent income for doing so (Farthing,
2012).The feeling that income support acknowledges care as
work is further supported by research on those receiving caregiving allowances, although the level of payment is key, with
small amounts perceived as signifying low value (Singleton &
Fry, 2015).
It is unclear, however, that a BIG would have similar effects.
First of all, if a BIG is set too low it could be perceived, as with
caregiving allowances, as a signifier of low value, rather than
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as recognition of important work. Second, unlike child benefits
or caregiving allowances, BIG is, by design, neutral regarding
purpose or activity (it is unconditional). Therefore, while it
might raise psychological valuation via a societal recognition
that there are worthwhile activities beyond paid employment
in a general sense, by virtue of not specifically valuing any
particular activity, such as care work, it is unclear whether it
would have any sort of direct psychological effect on women
who are performing such activities.
However, another way of looking at the psychological
impact of a basic income (or individual independent income),
other than the potential valuation of previously unrecognized
domestic and care work, is the impact of independent income
on health and well-being. There have been some studies of the
relationship between women's socio-economic status and their
psychological health, which focused on the gendered division
of financial control or gendered experience of financial strain
within the household; an identifiable link was found between
the division of expenditure responsibilities and psychological
distress. One such study explored the relationship between
psychological well-being and savings, investments, and debts
(Kan & Laurie, 2010). It found that there was a growing independence in financial arrangements between couples, with
investments and debts more likely to be individually held.
Savings, on the other hand, were viewed as shared assets.
In terms of psychological well-being, the authors found that
men's psychological well-being was affected by their own
levels of savings, investments, and debts rather than their partners', while women's well-being was influenced by both their
own levels and that of their partners.
Rottman's (1994) study of income distribution looked at
the relationship between the financial management system,
the degree of sharing of resources and the psychological wellbeing of men and women, as measured separately from the
overall well-being of the household. He found that there was
a statistically significant relationship between income sharing
and levels of psychological distress, as well as feelings of fatalism. Sharing of income was associated with lower levels of
psychological distress and lower levels of fatalism. The effects
were found to be stronger for wives than for husbands. A more
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recent study (Cantillon & Moran, 2016) suggests that wives
faced with the burden of managing scarce financial resources
suffered higher levels of psychological distress. Further, their
research found that there is a significant negative relationship
for wives between having an independent income and their fatalism scores. That is, an independent income has a significant
beneficial effect on her levels of fatalism or feelings of powerlessness. Further, the higher the independent income that
accrues to the wife, the greater the positive impact on her psychological health. This suggests that the contribution of a BIG
to economic security could be especially psychologically beneficial for low-income women who are responsible for making
ends meet within the household.
Time Allocation: Leisure Time and Household/Care Work
The fourth effect relates to the issue of inequalities in time
and participation in unpaid work. As noted, some BIG advocates have argued that unconditional cash benefits can raise
the status of work outside the labor market, as well as reduce
economic pressure to create space for such activity, thus potentially contributing to a reduction in time-based inequalities between women and men in the home. Zelleke (2011, p.
39) in particular argues that, while a BIG would not guarantee
a shift in men's participation in unpaid work, it would "decrease the costs to men of doing so, and would increase their
opportunities to break out of the gendered distribution that
confines men to paid employment-centric models of contributory citizenship."
While this argument makes sense logically, existing evidence on shifts in patterns of time spent in household and care
work suggests that opportunities for men to decrease their
time in paid employment do not necessarily correspond to increases in time spent in other forms of work rather than leisure.
One of the great demographic shifts over the past half century
has been women's increased participation in paid employment. This was optimistically viewed as a gender revolution
in which the division of labor between men and women would
be substantially reduced, with men taking on a greater share
of the household labor as women take on a greater share of
employment labor. Yet, persistent inequalities seem to suggest
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that the revolution 'stalled' (England, 2010).
While men have increased their time spent in household
and care work over time (Gershuny, Bittman, & Brice, 2005;
Van Hook, Brown, & Bean, 2006), it has not been proportional
to women's increased time in paid employment, nor crucially,
to their increased income (Brines, 1994). In fact, much of the
reduction in the disparity in men's and women's time spent in
household tasks has come as a result of women doing less and/
or 'outsourcing' those services by hiring domestic workers or
purchasing time-saving appliances, rather than as a redistribution among members of the household (Bittman, England,
Sayer, Folbre, & Matheson, 2003; Gupta, 2007). This suggests
that increasing women's income via a BIG may well lead to
further expenditures on childcare services and other means of
reducing women's own time in unpaid activities, rather than
an increase in men's unpaid work. However, Vollenweider
(2013) points out that the supply of domestic services may well
fall (or prices may rise) in the presence of BIG providing financial security for low-income workers currently providing such
services. Under those circumstances, household redistribution
may be more likely.

Conclusion
While basic income has been championed as a reform for
reducing inequality between households, it can also be expected to have an impact on inequality within households. An individual entitlement to an income floor better accommodates
core feminist insights about the "black box" of the household
and possible inequalities between men and women in coupled
relationships, than do some policy reform ideas, such as the
Negative Income Tax, which persists in the assumption that all
households conform to a unitary model.
The evidence base for a BIG, however, is currently limited,
and as such, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the likely
impact of a BIG on within-household inequalities. Our analysis of existing BIG pilots/schemes, proxies for a BIG (e.g., universal child benefits) and the broader evidence base on intrahousehold inequalities in income and expenditures, living
standards, well-being and time use, suggests that the impact
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of a BIG on gendered inequalities within the household is
ambiguous.
A BIG seems most likely to have a direct effect on women's
material welfare by reducing intra-household inequalities with
respect to independent income. Given that previous research
has shown that access to an independent income has important
implications for improving women's living standards within
the household, a BIG could be expected to improve at least
some women's living standards, particularly those who otherwise would have no or little independent income. It is also
likely to have a direct effect on psychological well-being and
feelings of economic autonomy, again via the guarantee of an
independent income, regardless of labor force participation.
Here studies of child benefits paid to primary caregivers are
telling, as interviews with recipients demonstrated that they
are often valued as independent income (e.g., Farthing, 2012).
Discussions of policy reforms usually focus on material
outcomes, yet the symbolic or non-material impact should be
recognized: economic autonomy, psychological valuation and
feelings of control are of value for their own sake, irrespective of material welfare. Additionally, the individual nature
of a BIG is, on its own, a powerful statement about women
(and children) as citizens in their own right, not as dependents
within a household. Advocates find the radical nature of BIG
in its symbolism as much as (if not more so than) the actual
financial gains. This perhaps explains why there has been only
limited attention to the institutional details: the point is a paradigm shift in how citizenship is understood, in addition to the
more limited question of how to guarantee a particular level
of welfare.
Nevertheless, if the amount of a BIG is too low, it could
leave women, in particular, financially deprived, especially if
coupled with decreased labor force participation, which may
be the case for at least some women. This issue rightly gives
some feminists pause and is an important arena for future research and an issue which should be included in any specific
BIG reform proposal. Further, a BIG seems less likely to have
a direct effect on reducing inequalities with regard to time allocation, specifically leisure time and time spent in performing household and care work, although an indirect effect is
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possible.
There is a complex link between income/financial resources, bargaining power, gender ideologies, and time allocation which is still not fully understood. So while BIG may
have a straightforward income effect, for example, it is less
clear that changes in income will also lead to changes in bargaining power which is important for negotiating equality in
other aspects, such as household/care work and leisure-time.
Some evidence suggests that "gender trumps money" in such
negotiations (Bittman et al., 2003) in which case a BIG could
be expected to have limited effect on its own—that is, in the
absence of further cultural shifts in social norms about men's
and women's roles.
This points to the broader issue of how any impact of a
BIG also depends on interaction with the broader cultural
and policy context regarding gender relations; BIG on its own
cannot be expected to bring into effect a gender revolution—
deep-seated change will require more than the introduction of
an income floor. Going forward, the key issue will be how to
capture the benefits of a BIG, especially as it pertains to increasing women's autonomy, while reducing any potentially
negative effects on women's welfare, which means greater attention to interactions between a BIG and other gender equality proposals. In particular, this will require a higher quality
evidence base on the gendered effects of a BIG, in addition to
philosophical discussions about the normative implications of
a BIG for gender equality. Much of the empirical analyses of a
BIG have focused on the question of labor market incentives,
but there is more to understand about the gendered impact
of a BIG, specifically whether, in practice, it would have the
implied effect on women's economic autonomy and living
standards within the household, and whether this, in turn,
would lead to the reduction of inequalities of power between
men and women in coupled relationships.
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